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THE STATE OF FLORIDA

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Did the Supreme Court of Florida err in considering a police canine snilf of a suspected
hydroponic marijuana grow house a search under the Fourth Amendment despite the
precedent set by this Court that canine sniffs are sui generis and have not been considered
searches?

II.

Did the Supreme Court of Florida err in subjecting a minimally-invasive canine snilf to
the probable cause standard although this Court has subjected other minimally-invasive
cursory inspections to a balancing test that results in the use of a lesser evidentiary
standard akin to reasonable suspicion?
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No. 11-564

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FALL TERM 2012

THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner
V.

JOELIS JARDINES,
Respondent.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

^

BRIEF FOR PETITONER
OPINION BELOW
The opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida are reported at Jardines v. Florida, 73 So.

^

3d 34 (Fla. 2011) {'"Jardines II”). The opinion of the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third
District, is reported at Florida v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) {"Jardines F).
JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012).

1

4»

STANDARD OF REVIEW
In analyzing the threshold issue of whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the police
behavior in question, the standard is to “examine the District Court's judgment that the police
seized [the defendant] under a de novo standard of review, as firmly entrenched doctrine in this
court and the Supreme Court requires.” United States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415,417 (D.C. Cir.
1990). Only after the initial question of applicability has been answered does the Court analyze
whether the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement has been satisfied. “[Ajs a
general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de
novo on appeal.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,699 (1996). However, the Ornelas
Court urged reviewing courts to proceed cautiously: “We hasten to point out that a reviewing
court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give
due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement
officers.” Id, at 699. Applying a de novo standard of review reduces law enforcement s
incentive to obtain a warrant, whereas a deferential standard reinforces the preferred behavior of
warrant seeking. Id. “We think reaffirmation of this standard better serves the purpose of
encouraging recourse to the warrant procedure.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 237 (1983).
Thus, unless this Court finds that the trial court was clearly erroneous in assessing the
reasonableness of the warrants, its standard is to limit its discretionary use of de novo review and
defer as much as possible to the trial court’s findings of fact and inferences.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

/»

1

Statement of the Facts
On the morning of December 5,2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade
^

Police Department surveyed a residential building at 13005 SW 257 Terrace in Miami-Dade

2

County, Florida. (J.A. 3, 8.) Detective Pedraja went to the building to investigate a tip that
Crime Stoppers had received on November 3, 2006, that the building was being used for the
illegal cultivation of marijuana. (J.A. 8.)
Detective Pedraja had vast experience and training in narcotics. (J.A. 131.) He had
worked on hydroponic laboratory cases for approximately four years prior to the trial in this case.
(J.A. 37.) He was trained by the Southeast Florida Institute of Criminal Justice to identify
narcotics and he attended narcotics identification schools through the Miami-Dade Police
Department Training Bureau. (J.A. 5.) Detective Pedraja also had practical experience in
narcotics identification from having participated in many narcotic search and seizure actions,
marijuana hydroponics laboratory investigations, and observations of marijuana grown via
traditional and hydroponic methods. (J.A. 5.)
That morning, two other experienced, well-trained detectives assisted Detective Pedraja:
Detective Doug Bartelt, who is a narcotics canine handler, and K.-9 drug detection dog Franky.
(J.A. 9-13.) Franky is trained to detect the odor of marijuana and several other types of
narcotics. (J.A. 13.) He has been involved in over 650 actions to detect narcotics and has given
a positive alert 399 times. (J.A. 13.) Franky and the canine handler, Detective Bartelt, together
complete weekly maintenance trainings. (J.A. 13.) Part of the weekly training includes negative
testing and distracter training to ensure that Franky does not alert to anything other than the
contraband substances he is trained to detect. (J.A. 13.) Detective Bartelt worked on the
Narcotic Bureau of the Miami-Dade Police Department for six years prior to the search in
question. (J.A. 10.) He has completed multiple Canine Narcotics Detection Courses and is
certified as a canine handler. (J.A. 9-12.)

^

Dclcclive Pedraja observed the property for approximately fifteen minutes on the
morning in question. (J.A. 32.) Then Detective Bartelt approached the front door of the building
with Franky in the lead and Detective Pedraja behind. (J.A. 35.) Franky gave a positive alert to

^

the presence of marijuana, which is one of the contraband narcotics he is trained to detect. (J.A.
50-53.) When Detective Pedraja walked up closer to the front door, he smelled live marijuana
plants. (J.A. 36.) Detective Bartelt and Franky then returned to their vehicle; they were on the
premises a total of only five to ten minutes. (J.A. 54.)
Detective Pedraja knocked at the door but received no answer. (J.A. 37.) He walked into
the front yard and heard an air conditioning unit mnning without cycling off. (J.A. 37.) This
observation suggested that the home was a marijuana grow house, which uses heavy air
conditioning to cool heat produced by high intensity light bulbs necessary for growing marijuana

m

indoors. (J.A. 38.)
After about fifteen to twenty minutes, Detective Pedraja went back to the threshold of the
front door. (J.A. 37.) He observed that the window shades were drawn and that there were no

^

cars in the driveway. (J.A. 109.) The property was not fenced. (J.A. 76.) The area around the
building was completely open, and there was a large sidewalk-driveway combination leading to
the front door. (J.A. 49, 76.) After observing the property as described, Detective Pedraja left

m

the premises to prepare a request for a search warrant, as he had done in similar situations in the
past. (J.A. 38, 132.) The search warrant was granted later that day on the basis that the detective
had probable cause that the premises contained a controlled substance. (J.A. 3, 15.) When
r

Detective Pedraja returned to the building with the search warrant, he found more than twentyfive pounds of marijuana and a hydroponics laboratory for cultivating marijuana. (J.A. 112.)

4

The police also found Respondent Joelis Jardines on Ihe premises and arrested him for
trafficking marijuana. (J.A. 112.)
Procedural History
On June 8, 2007, Respondent filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his house
in the district court. (J.A. 1.) The trial court granted Respondent’s motion to suppress on June
13, 2007, stating that the use of a drug detector dog constituted an unreasonable search, and that
officers did not have sufficient probable cause to search Respondent’s house. (J.A. 16, 134.)
The State of Florida appealed, and the District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded on
October 22, 2008, holding that the canine sniff was not a search, and that the warrant granted
after the canine sniff was based on sufficient probable cause. Jardines /, 9 So. 3d at 10.
Respondent appealed, and on April 14, 2011, the Supreme Court of Florida quashed the District
Court of Appeal’s decision. Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 34.
The Supreme Court of Florida reasoned that the canine sniff was an unreasonable
intrusion into the protected area of the home. Jardines //, 73 So. 3d at 56. The court held the
canine sniff to be a search because a canine reveals more than the presence of contraband, the
public spectacle involved in such a police action is embarrassing, and the sanctity of the home
warrants heightened safeguards. Id. at 49. The court also held that the appropriate evidentiary
standard to apply is reasonable suspicion, believing that this Court’s precedence precludes a
canine sniff from falling within the minimally intmsive exception to general rule of probable
cause. Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 53. The State of Florida appealed to the Supreme Court of the
United States on October 26, 2011, and certiorari was granted on January 6, 2012. (J.A. 1.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of Florida erred in treating a canine sniff as a search subject to a
probable cause evidentiary standard and its judgment should be reversed.
This Court has previously decided that canine sniffs for illegal narcotics are not searches
subject to Fourth Amendment analysis. Such investigations do not violate the Katz v. United
States test that hinges upon whether an investigation violates a person’s reasonable expectation

of privacy since canine sniffs alert only to the presence of illegal material. A person has no
reasonable expectation of privacy tor contraband, and the sniff reveals nothing about an
individual’s legal activities. The canine sniff outside Respondent’s house was conducted from a
publicly-accessible path on which the officer was legally present and, like other canine sniffs, it
alerted only to the presence of contraband, telling the officer nothing about Respondent’s legal
activities. Because this cursory inspection did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy or
any property right, it does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search.
Alternatively if this Court concludes that the canine sniff on Respondent’s property was a
search, reasonable suspicion is the appropriate evidentiary standard a court should use to assess
the sniff s legality. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio and New Jersey v. T.L. O, this Court has carved
out situations in which it applies a standard lower than probable cause to minimally invasive
investigations where public interests outweigh the privacy interests intruded upon. Such cases
are judged by a standard of reasonable suspicion rather than the probable cause standard to
which full-scale searches are held. Canine sniffs fall within this zone of reasonable suspicion
that the Court has already recognized because of their minimally intrusive nature. Accordingly,
the canine sniff in question would be best analyzed under the reasonable suspicion standard,
which the particular facts of this case are sufficient to satisfy.

Petitioner requests that this Court reverse the Supreme Court of Florida and remand the
case with direction that this canine sniff does not qualify as a search under the Fourth
Amendment or, in the alternative that it is a search, that its legality be assessed under the
reasonable suspicion standard.
ARGUMENT
I.

CANINE SNIFFS ARE NOT SEARCHES ACCORDING TO THIS AND OTHER
COURTS, AND NEITHER IS THE CANINE SNIFF IN THIS CASE.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizure ...U.S. Const, amend. IV. This Court has defined the Fourth Amendment
through the Katz test and, more recently, through the Jones test. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347(1967); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).

The TCfl/z test requires

a two-part

inquiry to determine if a challenged police action constitutes a search: “first, has the individual
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is
society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 211 (1986). This is understood as the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test. In Jones,
this Court recently reintroduced trespass of property to supplement the reasonable expectation of
privacy test to determine whether a government action constituted a search. 132 S. Ct. at 949.
This Court has already applied the Katz test to several cases involving canine sniffs and has held
generally that a police canine sniffing for illegal narcotics does not intrude on an individual’s
expectation of privacy and thus is not a search. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698
(1983); City ofIndianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).

#

m

A.

This Court Has Held that Canine Sniffs Arc Not Searches in a Variety of Settings.
and the Same Standard Should Apply Here to tiie Cuitilage of the Home.

This Court has reviewed cases on canine sniffs in public places, such as airports, and at
highway stops. Place, 462 U.S. at 698; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40. In every instance, this Court
has held that a canine sniff is not a search. Place, 462 U.S. at 698; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40.
Here, although the canine sniff was on the front porch of defendant’s home, this area of the home
was still open to the public. (J.A. 35.) The holdings of Place and Edmond should apply because,
although additional protection is granted to the home, no additional protection is granted to the
public areas around the home. See generally Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
1.

Canine sniffs in airports are not searches because they only reveal
information about the presence of narcotics in luggage and do not reveal
personal information about the luggage contents.

In Place, this Court held that a canine sniff in an airport for narcotics is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment because the canine did not expose noncontraband items. 462 U.S.
at 698. There, defendant was suspected of carrying narcotics in his luggage on the basis of his
behavior while travelling in the airport. Id. at 699. The defendant’s luggage was detained and a
police canine alerted to narcotics. Id. Police ultimately discovered 1,125 grams of cocaine in his
luggage. Id. This Court held that the police could conduct the canine sniff without a warrant
because the sniff “[did] not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden
from public view,” and only gave authorities limited information of whether contraband was
present. Id. at 707. This analysis suggests that there was no invasion of privacy in Place, since
no personal items were exposed. Because canine sniffs reveal limited information about the
presence of narcotics, the Court deemed it “sui generis ” and affirmed that there was “no other
investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained
and in the content of the information revealed by the procedure.” Id. The canine sniff neither

8

m

m

invaded the defendant's privacy, nor could it be presumed to constitute a trespass on his personal
property since the facts indicate that his luggage was never opened and the contents were not
investigated or displayed before a warrant was obtained. Place, 462 U.S. at 707
Here, Officer Franky’s sniff did not publicly reveal any personal information about
Respondent. (J.A. 36-37.) The sniff merely confirmed the authorities’ suspicion of
Respondent’s marijuana grow house before they obtained a warrant to enter Respondent’s house.

m
(J.A. 15, 50-53.) The officers on the scene did not open a window or seize any property by
performing the canine sniff. (J.A. 50-53.) The canine simply entered the public throughway in
front of Respondent’s house, spent five minutes sniffing the front door premises, and exited after
alerting his handler to narcotics. (J.A. 54.) Detective Pedraja then knocked on Respondent’s
front door and shortly left after no response. (J.A. 37.) In this process, none of Respondent’s

m

personal items were viewed, exposed to the public, or detected. {See generally J.A. 37, 50-53,
54.) Here, the canine sniff was limited in the manner and content of information it revealed, did
not invade privacy or constitute a trespass, and thus was not a search under the Fourth
Amendment.
2.

m

Canine sniffs at highway stops are not searches because the canine does
not intrude on the privacy of the driver when detecting illicit drugs.

A canine sniff at a lawful traffic stop is not a search under the Fourth Amendment
because the canine only walks around the outside of the car and does not reveal to the police or
the public any personal information beyond the presence of narcotics. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32,
35. In Edmond, police used trained canines to detect illegal narcotics at vehicle checkpoints
around the City of Indianapolis. Id at 35. The narcotics detection dogs walked around the
outside of stopped vehicles and alerted officials to the presence of drugs. Id. This Court
reaffirmed its earlier position in Place that “an exterior sniff of an automobile does not require

9

entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or
absence of narcotics.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40. The canine did not violate the privacy of the
vehicle’s owner by sniffing the outside, and did not reveal any information about the car other
than whether it contained narcotics. Id. Similarly, it can be inferred that Edmond does not
violate the Jones standard since the canine sniff did not constitute a trespass on the vehicle. See
id. at 40; Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. Here, Franky walked around the public throughway of the

house and alerted the police to drugs. (J.A. 35.) His sniff on the exterior of the house did not
require entry into the house and only disclosed whether narcotics were present. (J.A. 35.)
Therefore, like the sniff in Edmond, Franky’s sniff did not reveal any information about the
inside of Respondent’s house beyond whether it contained narcotics, and thus no search
occurred.
3.

This Court should follow circuit court decisions, which have
overwhelmingly held that canine sniffs are not searches.

In United States v. Brock. 417 F.3d 692, 693 (7th Cir. 2005), the Seventh Circuit held that
a canine sniff for narcotics outside of the defendant’s locked door did not constitute a search.
The police entered the defendant’s apartment by invitation of his roommate and were notified
that the defendant had large quantities of contraband items in his room. Id. at 693. The police
brought Yoba, a trained canine, to the common area and Yoba gave a positive alert to narcotics
in front of the defendant’s door. Id. at 693, 694. The court reasoned that the officers were
lawfully present in the common area of the apartment, the canine sniff only detected the presence
of contraband, and that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.
Id. The court distinguished these facts from a thermal imager in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.

27,32 (2001), because the canine sniff did not reveal information about the defendant’s home

beyond the presence of narcotics. Brock, 417 F.3d at 696. The facts in the present case are
identical, and thus the same logic should apply.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision was consistent with the decisions from Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. See generally United States v. Vasqnez, 909 F.2d 235, 238
(7fh Cir. 1990) (holding that a canine sniff in a public alley of a private garage was not a
warrantless search); United States v. Reed. 141 F. 3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that a
canine sniff was not a search when canine team was lawfully present inside a home); United
States

V.

Reyes. 122 F.3d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a canine sniff outside a hotel

room was not a search because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public
hallway); United States v. Lingenfelter. 997 F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that a canine
sniff of a commercial warehouse was not a search because defendant “could have no legitimate
expectation that a narcotics canine would not detect the odor of marijuana”); United States v.
Colyer. 878 F.2d 469,477 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a canine sniff of a sleeper car from

train’s public corridor was not a search because it did not reveal items that would be hidden
from view). But see United States v. Thomas, 151 F.2d 1359, 1366-67 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding
that a canine sniff from hallway outside defendant’s apartment was a search because defendant
had a legitimate expectation of privacy over the smells emanating from his apartment).
4.

Because human officers can sniff premises without a warrant under the
plain sniff doctrine, the same standard should apply to canine officers.

In Kyllo, this Court confirmed that eyes cannot be guilty of trespass, thus visual
surveillance does not constitute a search. 533 U.S. at 32. In United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d
738, 747 (10th Cir. 2006), the court held that an officer’s use of smell was permissible as an
extension of the plain view doctrine. Logically, if an object in plain view could be lawfully
observed by police, then a smell clearly perceived outside of the home can also be lawfully

observed by the police. Angelos, 433 F.3cl at 747. The smell leaves the house for any member
of the public to perceive, and thus a dog does not intrude on private space by perceiving that
aroma. SeeJardines //, 73 So. 3d at 57 (Lewis, J. concurring); United States v. Jenkins, 452 F.
3d 207, 214 (2nd Cir. 2006). The faculties granted to humans and animals alike to perceive the
world around them cannot trespass on private property. See Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 57 (Lewis,
J. concurring); Jenkins, 452 F. 3d at 214 A nose cannot be guilty of trespass any more than the
eyes can be, as smells disseminating from a house are free and open to the public and cannot
hold a reasonable expectation of privacy. See Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 57 (Lewis, J. concurring);
Jenkins, 452 F. 3d at 214.

B.

This Court Has Held that the Standard for Determinina Whether a Search
Occurred Is if the Defendant Had a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, and This
Court Has Held that There Is No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in
Contraband.

This Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy test was established in Katz and is
comprised of two prongs to determine if a challenged police action constitutes a search: ‘‘first,
has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged
search? Second, is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?” Ciraolo, 476
U.S. at 211. In United States v. Jacobsen, this Court held that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy in contraband because the Fourth Amendment does not protect individuals committing
a crime. 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984). Here, although Respondent may have had a subjective
expectation of privacy in his home to maintain his hydroponic marijuana grow house, his
expectation is unreasonable and this Court does not recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in contraband.

1.

A subjective expectation of privacy is insufficient if that expectation is not
reasonable, and here Respondent’s expectation of privacy in the smells
emanating from his residence was not reasonable.

In its application of the Katz test, this Court has found that even if a defendant manifests
a subjective expectation of privacy, an invasion on that expectation by police is not a search if
the defendant’s expectation is not an expectation that society would recognize as reasonable.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 207. In Ciraolo, officers suspected that the defendant was growing

marijuana in his backyard but were unable to visually view the backyard from the street because
the defendant had installed nine-foot tall fences surrounding his property. Id. The officers
chartered a plane for the purpose of flying over the defendant’s property, and they visually
identified marijuana plants in the backyard. Id. In applying Katz, this Court found that the
defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy since he had installed fences high enough to

m

block most views of his property. W. at 211-12. However, a telephone repairman or a passerby
with the right angle could have seen over the high fence. Id. at 214. Although the defendant had
a subjective expectation of privacy, this Court held that it was not a reasonable expectation since

m

the backyard could be easily visible from the airspace. Id. The officers’ airplane was in
navigable airspace, which is open to the public, and their visual observations were physically
nonintrusive. Id. Since the defendant’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable and the

m
officers’ activities did not constitute a trespass, no search occurred. Id.
Here, the officers and canine only used the public throughway in conducting their
investigation. (J.A. 35.) Although Respondent may have manifested a subjective expectation to
be free from wandering noses that might perceive the scent of his large scale growing operation,
his expectation was unreasonable because these scents were free and open to the public. See
Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 63 (Polston, J., dissenting). It would be unreasonable to assume that a
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dog would never enter one’s unenclosed porch to snitYaround the area. Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at
63 (Polston, J., dissenting). It is equally unreasonable to assume that a police officer would not
enter the front porch area, just as a mailman docs, to knock on the front door. See generally
Oliver, 466 U.S.at 177. This area is open to the public and can be viewed or smelled by any

member of the public. See id.
2.

This court has held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for
possession of contraband.

When a test for contraband is performed and reveals no other personal information
besides the presence of the illegal drugs, a defendant cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Jacobsen, 476 U.S. at 207.

Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,406 (2005), the

defendant was stopped for speeding on a public highway. The arresting police officer radioed a
second officer and his police canine. Id. The dog alerted positive for drugs in the vehicle after
walking around the exterior of the car. Id. Upon searching the vehicle, the officers discovered
marijuana in the trunk. Id. This Court “held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be
deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals possession of contraband
‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’” Id. at 408. Since the canine only revealed the
possession of contraband for which there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, there was no
Fourth Amendment search, /d. at 416.
In Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111, a private shipping carrier detected a suspicious white
powdery substance in a package that had been damaged. The carrier asked Drug Enforcement
Agency officers to examine the package, and the officers tested for cocaine. Id. The Court
applied the Katz test and deemed that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy, since “a
chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not
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compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123. Thus, the test did
not reveal any information about the substance except whether it was an illegal drug. Id.
Here, Respondent possessed twenty-five pounds of marijuana for distribution in a
hydroponic laboratory in his domicile. (J.A. 112.) Officer Franky was brought to Respondent’s
front porch only to detect if there were illegal substances. (J.A. 37.) Since the interest in
contraband items does not constitute a legitimate interest in privacy, Respondent could not have
had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his large-scale marijuana growing operation. See
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 416.

3.

The Florida Supreme Court erred in inferring that police action outside
Respondent’s home impeded Respondent’s Privacy.

In its holding, the Florida Supreme Court applied the Katz test, but deemed that the
potentially “overbearing and harassing conduct” of the police determined whether their action
was reasonable. Jardines //, 73 So. 3d at 49. Using this logic, the court concluded that the
canine sniff was a search. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida misinterprets the case law on this
subject. As discussed in Ciraolo, a defendant’s subjective expectation of privacy may still be
overruled by whether that expectation was reasonable. 476 U.S. at 214. In a concurring opinion
in Jardines //, Justice Lewis of the Florida Supreme Court explained that the consideration of
embarrassment and police action is a policy consideration that influences whether there is a
reasonably expectation of privacy in an area outside the house. Jardines II, 73 So. 3d at 61
(Lewis, J., concurring). While it is true that this Court has taken the “degree of spectacle” into
account in previous decisions, this Court was referring to the embarrassment suffered by a
defendant if the police publicly removed his private items from his luggage. See Place, 462 U.S.
at 698. In this case, no items were revealed from the domicile at all. (J.A. 36-37.) The canine
alerted to narcotics, yet the alert in itself appears to be only a slight change in behavior to the
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untrained eye. (J.A. 50.) The canine was the only officer present on the porch itself, as
Detective Pedraja and Detective Bartlett were standing behind the entryway to the porch. (J.A.
50.) The officers were in front of the house for a total of fifteen minutes. (J.A. 50.) Not only
was there no public spectacle in the situation at hand, but this consideration falls outside of the
legal question of whether Respondent has a reasonable expectation of privacy on his front porch.
Janlines //, 73 So. 3d at 61.

C.

Because Canine Sniffs Are Sui Generis and Only Reveal Information About
Contraband, They Arc Distinct from Thermal Imagers or Recording Peyices,.

This Court held that use of thermal imaging devices to determine heat levels inside a
house is a search under the Fourth Amendment. Kyllo, 533 U.S, at 39. Additionally, this Court
held that using recording devices in public or private areas to obtain information which could not
otherwise be discovered by police is a search. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358. In both Kyllo and KatZy
this Court emphasized that the tools used by police gathered extensive private information that
could not otherwise be obtained. 533 U.S. at 39; 389 U.S. at 355. Here, Olficer Franky did not
reveal any additional information about the inside of Respondent’s house, and thus Kyllo and
Katz should not control the case at hand. 533 U.S. at 39; 389 U.S. at 355. {See J.A. 37.)

1.

Canine sniffs are distinct from thermal imagers and do not intrude on
private information, so should not be scrutinized under the Kyllo standard.

The case at hand is distinct from this Court’s ruling in Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27. In Kyllo,
police used a technologically-sophisticated thermal imaging device to detect whether large
amounts of heat were being produced from lamps used to grow marijuana hydroponically. Id. at
29, 30. In determining that the thermal imaging constituted a search, this Court reasoned that,
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home
that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally
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protected area’ constitutes a search.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. The Court proposed that perhaps
police could have inferred the time of day when the lady of the house took her shower based on
the readings on the thermal imager. Id. at 38. Obtaining this sort of private information was
considered both a violation of one’s reasonable expectation of privacy and a trespass since the
imager obtained information from within the walls of the house beyond the simple presence of
illegal marijuana growing operations. Id. at 38-39. This Court framed its decision in Kyllo in the
context of considering “what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm
of guaranteed privacy.” Id. at 34. This Court deemed that using sense-enhancing technology
that is not in general public use to obtain information constitutes a search. Id.
Here, the police canine did not obtain information beyond the presence of marijuana
somewhere in the residence. (^eeJ.A. 13,50.) The sniff only communicated information about
the presence of narcotics, and the dog was not capable of alerting the officers to private
information about Respondent merely by sniffmg. (^eeJ.A. 13.) The canine did not intrude
upon the interior of the domicile, nor did it have any ability to communicate to officers any other
information it may have perceived about the house and its surroundings. {See J.A. 13.) This
Court in Kyllo imagined that future surveillance technology would need to be considered under
the Fourth Amendment and used such consideration in its holding. 533 U.S. at 34. Here, the
same logic does not apply because canine dogs have been used in formal police action in
England since 1910 and in the United States since the 1950s. R.L. Block, Benefits of Canine
Squads, Vol. 7.2 Journal of Police Science and Administration 155, 156 (June 1979). A canine

is not a tool but an animal that can be trained to be sensitive to particular smells, just like a
human can be trained to excel in particular skills such as computer programming or mathematics.
Evidence of dogs bred to aid humans in hunting expeditions dates back to the time of King
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Tutankhamen in the thirteenth century before the common era. R.L. Block, supra, at 156. This
is hardly new “technology,” and the prevalence of dogs trained and bred to track particular
smells to assist in hunting indicates that their noses are not under the exclusive purvey of the
United States police force. See id. Since Officer Franky is not new technology and canine
smelling capabilities are available to the public at large, the facts of this case distinguish it from
the facts in Kyllo, and this Court should not apply Kyllo to the case at hand.
2.

Canine sniffs are distinct from recording devices in telephone booths
because the canine only tells officials if narcotics are present.

This Court established its reasonable expectation of privacy test in Katz. 389 U.S. at 361
(Harlan, J., concurring). In Katz, the defendant was arrested for illegal gambling after Federal
Bureau of Investigation officers placed an electronic listening and recording device outside a
phone booth that the defendant used to place illegal bets. Id. at 348. This Court that held the
formerly-used trespass doctrine was an insufficient test in determining when a government
search has occurred because new technologies allowed police to learn sensitive information
without an invasion of the defendant’s physical property. Id at 353. The Court held that the
recording devices, “violated the privacy upon which [the defendant] justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth.” Id. Although the phone booth was in a public setting, the defendant

m

expected privacy while on his phone call, which the government’s listening device intruded
upon. Id.
The case at hand is distinct because Respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in his home while growing illegal drugs, and even if he did, that privacy was not violated. If
police had placed a listening device by the door, they may have obtained information that
otherwise would have been assumed to be private. However, smells disseminating from a house
cannot be considered private when a human or dog could perceive them from outside of the
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domicile. See Angelos, 433 F.3d at 747. As stated, the dog cannot obtain further infonnation
from the house other than the presence of narcotics.
3.

Canine sniffs are an essential and widely used method of combating the
trafficking of marijuana, and considering them a search would hinder
police efforts.

The Florida Attorney General’s Office reports that marijuana is the second largest cash
crop in the state, after the citrus industry, from outdoor and indoor grow houses combined. An
Analysis ofFlorida's Drug Control Efforts: Third Interim Report of the Fifteenth Statewide
Grand Jury Before the Supreme Court ofFlorida, December 14,2000. A 2000 grand jury report

made a recommendation “to increase State appropriations to the Guard for their anti-drug efforts,
including the purchase and use of thennal imaging technology on aircraft surveillance to assist in
the detection of marijuana ‘grow-houses.’” Id. The problem is so prevalent in the State of
Florida that the Legislature was called upon to invest more funding in tools to assist in locating
grow house and outdoor marijuana operations. Id. In 2007,

1,002

marijuana grow houses were

discovered by law enforcement in Florida alone, often containing plants with almost double the
tetrahydrocannabinol -- the active chemical in marijuana -- present in marijuana plants grown
outdoors. Carmen Gentile, Florida's Marijuana Boom: House-Grown, and Potent, Time U.S.,
July 30, 2009, available at http://www.time.eom/time/nation/article/0,8599,1913401,00.
html#ixzz26DtlAkP5.
Canines are one of several methods for police to combat the prevalence of marijuana;
others include using thermal imaging devices and planes, both methods that have been
challenged before this Court. Robert C. Bird, An Examination ofthe Training and Reliability of
the Narcotics Detention Dog, 85 Ky. L.J. 405,432 (Winter 1996-1997). “The use of dogs to

supplement police strength dales back to the early 1300s.” R L. Block, supra, at 156. Formally,
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police canines were introduced into cities in the United States shortly after World War II
following an increase in crime and shortage of police officers. R.L. Block, supra, at 156.
Canines were used for a variety of reasons, but primarily as customs assistants to check incoming
cargo. Id. Not only is the canine selected for particular skills as a drug detection dog, but the
canine handler is also carefully selected and trained. Id. at 159. According to Mr. Bird, “Canine
alerts have resulted in countless seizures of illegal narcotics. Without them, fighting the tide of
narcotics trafficking would be significantly more difficult.” Bird, supra. See also Block, supra.
This Court should consider the value of using well-trained drug detection canines in identifying
marijuana grow houses.
II.

IF DETECTIVE PEDRAJA’S CURSORY INSPECTION IS A SEARCH, THEN
REASONABLE SUSPICION IS THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD BY WHICH TO
DETERMINE ITS LEGALITY.
Detective Pedraja’s cursory inspection of the building at 13005 SW 257 Terrace using

canine sniffing was not a search. If this Court determines that the detective’s activities did
constitute a search, this Court should adopt the approach articulated by Justice Blackmun that “a
dog sniff may be a search, but a minimally intrusive one that could be justified in this situation
under Terry upon mere reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 723 (1983)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Reasonable suspicion is the appropriate evidentiary standard to use
as an exception to the rule of probable cause because it is commensurate with the minimally
intrusive methods used in this case: a canine sniff outside a building that revealed nothing about
legal activities inside the building.
A.

Individuals Have No Constitutional Protection fi’om Reasonable Search and
Seizure.

The United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not

be violated ...U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Court’s determination of whether a search is
reasonable or unreasonable is detennined by the factual context surrounding the alleged search.
Terry V. OA/o, 392 U.S. 1,9(1968). “It must always be remembered that what the Constitution

forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.” Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 {I960) (emphasis added). Thus, the United States Constitution

and this Court’s decisions that interpret it dictate that reasonableness is the arbiter of whether a
search or seizure has subjected a person to an illegal government action, as judged by the facts ot
the particular case.
Adams v, Williams involved a situation in which this Court has applied a standard less

than probable cause to a police search. 407 U.S. 143, 145-46 (1972). This Court asserted that
“[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of
information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Id. In Adams, a police officer acted on a credible tip by
approaching the suspect and taking a concealed weapon from the exact place in the suspect s
clothing where the informant had said the weapon would be located. Id. at 145. .The Court
upheld this search as valid, noting that the officer’s brief search of the suspect “may be most
reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” Id. at 146.
B.

The Court Has a Preference that Searches Be Based on Probable Cause, Though It
Applies a Lower Standard in Many Situations.

This Court has determined that probable cause is the standard to which searches must
adhere, as a general rule. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973). The
amount of evidence that satisfies the probable cause standard is “evidence which would ‘warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that a [crime] has been committed ....” Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471,479 (1963) (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132,162
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(1925)). Thus, in most cases, it is the rule of this Court that a search warrant be issued upon a
showing of probable cause, which is satisfied by evidence that would lead a reasonable person to
believe criminal activity is occurring.
1.

The Supreme Court of the United States has identified searches to which it
applies a standard lower than probable cause.

Though probable cause is the general rule, this Court has determined that the rule has
exceptions. Indeed, ‘“probable cause’ is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. The
fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be
reasonable ...New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (emphasis added). This Court

recognizes reasonableness, not only by showing probable cause, but also “by balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails.” Camara v. Mm. Court ofS.F., 387 U.S.
523, 536-37 (1967). Two key decisions from this Court illuminate the standard that applies to
investigations for which probable cause is overly restrictive: Terry and T.L.O.
First, in Terry, this Court recognized a category of searches that satisfy the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement not by a showing of probable cause, but by showing
reasonable suspicion:
[W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot... he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31. While observing the suspect for several minutes on a beat the

officer had patrolled for thirty years, the officer in Terry noted specific suspicious
behaviors from which he inferred that the suspect was armed in preparation for a robbery.
Id. at 28. The officer subsequently stopped the suspect and patted him down for

weapons, finding a revolver. Id. at 29. The officer’s search actions were limited to
22

finding the contraband gun and were not a full-scale search. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. The
Court reasoned that the Constitution allows “a reasonable search for weapons for the
protection of the police officer ... regardless of whether [the officer] has probable cause
to arrest the individual for a crime.” Id. at 27.
The Terry opinion applied to a public safety stop for weapons, but is not limited
to a narrow construction. It is important to note that the Terry Court explicitly
recognized a legitimate governmental interest in investigatory searches that lead to crime
detection. Terry, 392 U.S. at 22. The Court explained that the balancing of interests
underpirming its application of a standard less than probable cause includes crime
detection: “One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and
detection.” Id. Thus, Terry is instructive also for cases that deal with crime detection
more broadly, such as the detection of contraband narcotics in the current case.
Second, in T.L.O, this Court relied upon the balancing test approach and applied it to
searches of public school students on campus:
[Tjhe accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the
substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in
the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be
based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is
violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.
T. L. O., 469 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added). T.L.O. was a public high school student

caught smoking, which was against school rules, in a school restroom by a teacher. Id. at
328. When Assistant Vice Principal Choplick questioned T.L.O. after the teacher’s
report, T.L.O. denied that she had been smoking and Mr. Choplick then searched her
purse for cigarettes. Id. This Court concluded that Mr. Choplick had a reasonable
suspicion, not just a vague hunch, that T.L.O. had cigarettes in her purse since a teacher
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had previously reported that the she had been smoking on campus. T. L O., 469 U.S. at
345-46. This Court upheld the legality of the search on grounds of reasonable suspicion,
asserting that Mr. Choplick had made a reasonable “sort of‘common-sense [conclusion]
about human behavior’ upon which ‘practical people — including government officials —
are entitled to rely.” Id. at 346 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981)).
2.

Minimally intrusive inspections are an exception to the probable cause
rule.

Since Terry and T.L.O., this Court has applied a balancing test to determine when a
standard lower than probable cause should apply to a search, and has recognized a number of
different situations where the public interest in safety or justice outweighs an individual’s
privacy interests. The common thread among these cases is their rationale. The primary
rationale this Court has used to uphold police inspections on less than probable cause is that the
police action is “so substantially less intrusive ... that the general rule requiring probable cause
to make Fourth Amendment ‘seizures’ reasonable could be replaced by a balancing test.”
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979). Contexts other than Terry and T.L.O. in which

the limited nature of the intrusion merits a standard lower than probable cause include: a
governmental employer’s search of an employee on matters related to employment, {O’Connor v.
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)), the search of a probationer’s home, {Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483

U.S. 868 (1987)), housing inspections, {Camara, 387 U.S. 523), a search of business premises in
a heavily regulated industry, {New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)), inspection of an
underground mine, {Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981)), prison inmates being subject to
body-cavity searches, {Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558-60 (1979)), border patrol stops at an
international border, {United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880-81 (1975)), search of
firearms-related businesses that are regulated by federal statute, {United States v. Biswell, 406
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U.S. 311,316 (1972)), and quick searches for weapons, {Terry, 392 U.S. at 20). As this panoply
of cases clarifies, this Court already permits searches under an evidentiary standard lower than
probable cause in many different contexts, including contexts that have nothing to do with guns,
where the inspection is so minimally intrusive that the public interest in conducting the search
clearly outweighs the individual’s privacy.
3.

A canine sniff is a minimally intrusive investigation that should be subject
to the reasonable suspicion evidentiary standard.

“The brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests is an
important factor in determining whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be Justifiable
on reasonable suspicion.” Place, 462 U.S. at 709. Canine sniffing is distinguished from other
investigative techniques because it permits the quick identification of illegal material inside a
closed container that does not have to be opened to reveal its legal contents. Kenneth L. Pollack,
Stretching the Terry Doctrine to the Search for Evidence of Crime: Canine Sniffs, State
Constitutions, and the Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 803, 805 (April, 1994).

Because it is less invasive, it is less protected than a more thorough search. Id. at 805-06. Thus,
because canine sniffs are minimally invasive and similar to the type of intrusion identified by
this Court in many other reasonable suspicion cases, the balancing test analysis developed by this
Court in Terry and T.L.O. should also apply to canine sniffs. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9; TL.O.,
469 U.S. 325.
Applying the Place criteria that brief, minimally intrusive investigations only require
reasonable suspicion to be legal, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that canine sniffs are an exception to
the general probable cause rule. United States v. Co/yer, 878 F.2d 469,477 (1989). InColyer,
the canine sniff did “‘not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from
view,’ and was not conducted in a manner or location that subjected appellant ‘to the

embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative
methods . ..Colyer, 878 F.2d at 477 (citing Place, 462 U.S. at 709). Just as in the present
case, the Colyer court’s primary conclusion was that the canine sniff was not a search, but that,
in the alternative, it would be a minimally intrusive investigation subject to reasonable suspicion.
W. at 483.
Appellate courts have already determined that reasonable suspicion is the applicable
standard for canine sniffs outside a residence, such as the one in the present case, in at least three
states.

The Court of Appeals of New York decided that a canine sniff “may be used without a

warrant or probable cause, provided that the police have a reasonable suspicion that a residence
contains ... contraband.” People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990). The Court of
Appeals of Indiana ruled that “reasonable suspicion is needed to conduct a canine sniff of a
private residence.” Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463, 470 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). According to the
Supreme Court of Nebraska, “The investigative tool of the canine sniff at the threshold of a
dwelling may be used where it is preceded by information amounting to reasonable, articulable
suspicion.” State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805 (Neb. 1999). Though not binding on this Court,
these decisions demonstrate a trend among the states that should inform this federal decision.
Though Dunn, Hoop, and Ortiz governed canine sniffs outside a residence, appellate
courts in many other states have determined that canine sniffs are subject to reasonable suspicion
in additional situations. For example, the Alaska Court of Appeals has found that “officers only
needed reasonable suspicion to use a reliable canine to conduct a canine sniff of [a] warehouse
exterior which was accessible to the public.” McGahan v. State, 807 P.2d 506, 511 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1991). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that “[a] narcotics detection canine may be
deployed to test for the presence of narcotics [in the area outside a storage unit] where: 1. the
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police are able to articulate reasonable grounds for believing that drugs may be present in the
place they seek to test; and 2. the police are lawtully present in the place where the canine sniff is
conducted.” Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74, 79 {Pa. 1987). The Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the same rule as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: “[WJe are persuaded by the
reasoning of other courts and legal scholars that the standard of reasonable, articulable suspicion
should also be considered in the process of balancing a person's privacy interests against the
public’s interest in effective criminal investigations.” State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 211-12
(Minn. 2005). Thus, the weight of state cases concerning canine sniffs, both outside a residence
and at other locations, is in favor of a reasonable suspicions standard.
C.

It Is Good Public Policy To Recognize Canine Sniffs as Within the Zone of
Reasonable Suspicion Already Carved Out bv This Court.

After a thorough review of the cases relating to canine sniffs of contraband at or near a
person’s home, “[t]he question of whether the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless canine
sniff of an individual's home seems all but resolved in favor of permitting the technique.”
Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband Exception to the Fourth
Amendment, 41 U. Mem. L. Rev. 299, 324 (Winter, 2010). This trend towards permitting canine

sniffs promotes good public policy and avoids the negative policy outcomes associated with
affirming the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Respondent’s favor.
Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of requiring probable cause for investigatory canine
sniffs is that it burdens law enforcement in gathering information needed to protect the public,
even though the police are using the least invasive method possible. “The greater suspicion
required for probable cause increases the investment of police time and resources.” Pollack,
supra, at 808. Since police time and resources are directly supported by taxpayer dollars, it is in

the public’s interest to keep law enforcement free of expensive trappings that are not necessary
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for protecting public safety. Canine sniffing is a minimally invasive tool that allows for efficient
crime detection without unnecessarily burdening the public resources invested in law
enforcement.
Comparing the law on searches to that on seizures, this Court has recognized stops as a
kind of seizure subject to a lower evidentiary standard than arrests, which can only be made with
probable cause. Pollack, supra, at 839-40. Distinguishing the less intrusive stop from the more
intrusive arrest recognizes that law enforcement needs the flexibility to deal with situations along
a gradient of suspicion where all cases are not the same. The lack of such a gradient for
searches, the sister of seizures under the Fourth Amendment, is inconsistent with the Court’s
analysis of seizures. It also fails to meet the needs of law enforcement at the ground level to
adequately protect public safety. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 209.
By reversing the Florida Supreme Court, this Court would create greater certainty for
both law enforcement and the public. This Court’s clarification on the canine sniffing issue will
give law enforcement the confidence to use this minimally intrusive investigatory techmque
appropriately and legally. The certainty will also help the public be secure in its right against
unreasonable government intrusion. The articulation of a clear regime to govern the use of

minimally invasive search techniques thus protects both the public and law enforcement and
further undergirds the rule of law. Pollack, supra, at 839-40.
Applying a balancing test to determine reasonableness would allow courts to make
deliberate choices between the competing interests of government and private individuals on a
case-by-case basis. This would be an improvement over the homogenous use of the probable
cause standard, which can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. It would increase the judiciary’s ability
to review the bases for searches in particular circumstances and help ensure that police practices
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are well-balanced with the privacy rights of the public. Silas J. Wasserstrom and Louis Michael
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 Geo. L. J. 19, 46-47 (October,
1988).
D.

Frankv’s Alert to Narcotics Outside Respondent’s House Is a Minimally Invasive
Inspection Within the Area This Court Has Carved Out for Reasonable Suspicion.

The canine sniff in question is significantly less intrusive than the Court-approved
exceptions to the probable cause rule. For example, the investigation in Brignoni-Ponce
involved the actual physical detention of a person, albeit for a very short time. 422 U.S. at 880.
In that case, the United States Border Patrol stopped an automobile in southern California on
suspicion that its passengers were undocumented aliens. Id. at 874-75. The officers pursued the
car, stopped it, and questioned the driver and two passengers. Id. at 875. The investigation
lasted long enough for the officers to learn that the passengers had entered the country illegally.
Id.

The facts of this case are distinguished from those in Brignoni-Ponce because Officer
Pedraja had no contact with Respondent during the canine sniff activity. See 422 U.S. at 880,
(J.A. 37.) In fact. Officer Franky never learned an34hing about Respondent other than his
possession of contraband, in which an individual cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. (J.A. 49-55).

543 U.S. at 408. Only the air outside the house m a non-

enclosed, publicly-accessibly part of the property was inspected. (J.A. 49, 58.) The sniff did not
subject Respondent to a more intrusive search that would be less discriminatory in what was
revealed. (J.A. 49-54.) The facts of this canine sniff are also analogous to the legal canine sniff
in Colyer, discussed above, in being minimally intrusive. Colyer, 878 F.2d at 477.
Because this cursory inspection was much less intrusive than investigations this Court has
already authorized on a reasonable suspicion basis, it falls within the space already carved out by
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this Court and does not represent an expansion of the use of a reasonable suspicion exception.
See Terry, 392 U.S. I; T.LO., 469 U.S. 325; Ortega, 480 U.S. 709; Griffin, 483 U.S. 868;
Camara, 387 U.S. 523; Burger, 482 U.S. 691; Donovan, 452 U.S. 594; Bell, 441 U.S. 520;
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873; Biswell, 406 U.S. 311. It is the uniquely minimally invasive

nature of Franky’s sniff outside Respondent’s home that qualities this case to be judged
according to the Terry balancing test and held to a reasonable suspicion standard of evidence.
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.

E.

Detective Pedraia’s Reliance on Canine Sniffing Satisfied the Reasonable
Suspicion Standard.

Since reasonable suspicion is the evidentiary standard that should be used to judge the
legality of the canine sniff outside Respondent’s front door, this Court must additionally decide
whether Officer Pedraja satisfied the standard when he invited Officer Franky to approach the
residence’s front door. As the record shows and as discussed below, Officer Pedraja met that
standard through reliance on articulable facts, including a reliable Crime Stoppers tip, that
justified his suspicion.
I.

An officer must base reasonable suspicion on articulable facts, including
anonymous tips that are reliable.

“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added). In Terry, police officer
McFadden observed the appellant from afar in a neighborhood the officer had patrolled for thirty
years. Id. at 5-6. He saw the appellant pace back in front of a store several times, stopping each
time to look in the window. Id. at 6. He saw the appellant talk with another person who was
pacing the same path. Id. Because the officer could articulate specific facts from his
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observations — much more than subjective hunches -- along with rational inferences based on his
experience, this Court upheld the officer’s search of the appellant based on reasonable suspicion.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27-28.

Anonymous tips, in addition to a police officer’s general observations, can form part of
an officer’s suspicion. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000). To do so, an anonymous tip
should have indicia of reliability sufficient to override the general presumption, which is that
“[ajnonymous tips ... are generally less reliable than lips from known informants and can form
the basis for reasonable suspicion only if accompanied by specific indicia of reliability ....” Id.
\x\.J.L., the police received an anonymous call that lacked any indication of credibility. Id. at

271. The Court specified that “[t]he reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be
reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.” Id.
at 272.
Furthermore, drug trafficking is a particularly dangerous offense to combat, and officers
must rely on tips for assistance. Officers attest to the risk they encounter when investigating
grow houses since drug traffickers typically try to protect their crop - thus their profits - by
storing firearms inside houses used as hydroponics labs. News, South Florida High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area (Oct. 5, 2012, 6:30 PM), http://www.sflhidta.org/news.html. Tips from
informants help protect law enforcement from drug-related violence and help them target their
efforts by giving them insider information about dangerous illicit activity. For example, in
Florida, “Miami Police Major Charles Nanney says informants played a crucial role in the
success of a statewide crackdown in June [2009] that resulted in the seizure of 6,828 marijuana
plants and 120 residential marijuana labs over the course of a few days.” Gentile, supra.
Without the additional reliability provided by tips to crime detection hotlines such as Crime

Stoppers, police face uniiecessaiy exposure to the risk of drug-related violence.
2.

Detective Pedraja had articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable
suspicion that there was marijuana inside the building.

The anonymous tip that Detective Pedraja investigated contained sufficient indicia of
credibility. It was predictive not just with respect to the location of the grow house but also with
respect to what would be found inside: contraband marijuana. (See J.A. 8.) With the window
shades of the house drawn, the caller could not have known what was inside without being privy
to some variety of insider information.
Detective Pedraja’s suspicion was based on more than a vague hunch. He suspected
criminal activity at the residence because of the cumulative weight of the Crime Stoppers tip that
alleged marijuana growing, his observations that all window blinds were closed and that no cars
were in the driveway, hearing a continuously-running air conditioner, and smelling live
marijuana plants. (J.A. 8, 36-37, 109.) “Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as
such, practical people formulated certain commonsense conclusions about human behavior;
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same -- and so are law enforcement officers.
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418. The Court permits law enforcement to draw commonsense conclusions,

which is exactly what Detective Pedraja did. Due to the Crime Stoppers tip and his own
observations, he concluded that there was marijuana inside the house. (J.A. 8-9.) Thus,
Detective Pedraja acted with a reasonable suspicion when he invited Franky and Detective
Bartelt onto the publicly-accessible porch of the house to confirm his suspicion.
F.

The Evidence Against Respondent Qualifies for the Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule.

Applying the probable cause evidentiary standard to this case would work against the
public interest and thwart the administration ofjustice. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,

32

922 (1984). Even if the Court decides that this cursory inspection was a search subject to a
probable cause standard that was not satisfied by Detective Pedraja, it should allow the evidence
in question to be used against Respondent under the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. In Leoriy this Court created an exception to the exclusionary rule where an officer
reasonably and in good faith relies on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. 468 U.S.
at 922-23. Permitting evidence obtained in good faith to be admitted protects the public from
people like Respondent who threaten the public wellbeing by flouting this country’s drug laws.
As the Court said in Leon, “[w]e conclude that the marginal or nonexistent benefits produced by
suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on a subsequently invalidated
search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of exclusion.” Id. at 922.
Here, Detective Pedraja acted in good faith. Detective Pedraja had previously written
affidavits for search warrants similar to the one he wrote in this case. (J.A. 132.) Those were
signed and granted by judges, just like the search warrant granted in this instance. (J.A. 132.)
Additionally, the trial court hearing this case had previously issued a search warrant, which was
upheld by the Third District Court of Appeal when challenged, based on observations identical to
those in this case: an officer smelled the odor of marijuana, the shades of a residence were
closed, and an air conditioning unit was running without shutting off (J.A. 119, 120.) Thus,
Detective Pedraja’s good faith was supported by his past experience of having similar search
warrants granted by a judge under similar circumstances.
The public safety cost of excluding the evidence of twenty-five pounds of marijuana
found inside the residence and exempting Respondent from responsibility is too high for this
Court to accept. Through his lawless actions operating a marijuana hydroponics lab, Respondent
put the public at risk of illegal narcotics activity and its concomitant violence. There is little

benefit in excluding the evidence since Detective Pedraja acted objectively and in good faith.
The evidence should be admitted and the Supreme Court of Florida should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Canine sniffs are not searches under the Fourth Amendment and thus should not be
subject to a probable cause evidentiary standard. This Court has held that canine sniffs of
luggage and cars do not violate the Fourth Amendment because the canines are in publicly
accessible places and the procedure does not reveal a defendant’s personal information.
Additionally, this Court has held that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
contraband. Here, Respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy on his porch and could
not have an expectation of privacy in his marijuana growing operation. Since the canine sniff
did not reveal any private information about Respondent beyond his ownership of illegal
substances, the canine sniff should not be considered a search.
Should this Court find that the canine sniff on Respondent’s property is a search, a
reasonable suspicion standard should be applied. This Court has indicated its willingness to
apply a standard lower than probable cause to minimally invasive investigations where public
interests outweigh the privacy interests intruded upon. In these cases, courts apply the
reasonable suspicion standard and not probable cause. Canine sniffs are minimally intrusive, and
thus should fall within the reasonable suspicion standard. Additionally, the public benefit of
eliminating marijuana grow houses and the officers’ need to proceed with caution when
approaching growing houses outweigh Respondent’s interest in privacy for contraband. For the
forgoing reasons. Petitioner requests that this Court REVERSE the Supreme Court of Florida and
REMAND this case with direction that this canine sniff does not qualify as a search under the

Fourth Amendment or, in the alternative that it is a search, that its legality be assessed under the
reasonable suspicion standard.
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